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PATENT POLICY + PROTECTION OF INVENTOR'S
RIGHTS = THE PATENTABILITY OF MATHEMATICAL
ALGORITHMS
I. INTRODUCTION

The importance of computer software in today's society, as well as
the great expense in producing it, has spurred the current interest by
the computer industry in the availability of legal protection for computer software.' The patent system, developed to advance science and
technology,' appears to be the ideal system for such computer software
protection. This system, however, has not sufficiently protected programmers' rights to computer software. The insufficiencies arise out of
judicial exclusion of mathematical algorithms from patentable statutory subject matter.3

The United States Supreme Court defines an algorithm as "[a]
procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem."' Using
this definition, lower courts have been inconsistent with patent claim
decisions involving algorithms.5 Further attempts by the lower courts to
clarify this definition have been contradictory and confusing. 6
This comment discusses the underlying principles used by the
courts to exclude mathematical algorithms from statutory subject matter. The complexity and varying definitions of the term "algorithm" are
illustrated in the cases evaluated in the background section. The standard developed by the Court of Custom and Patent Appeals

1. See, e.g., Idelle R. Abrams, Statutory Protection of the Computer Program: A Comparison of Copyright and Patent Laws, 9 COMPUTER/L.J. 125, 126 (1989) (increased importance of
computer software requires protection by intellectual property law to prevent piracy); Joseph P.
Zammit, Computers, Software and the Law, 68 A.B.A. J._970 (1982) (discussion of the prominence of computer software to business and the legal system); Note, Computer Intellectual Property and Conceptual Severance, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1046, 1046 (1990) (viable intellectual property protection crucial to protect expensive computer technology from inexpensive copying);
Jeffrey S. Goodman, Note, The Policy Implications of Granting Patent Protection to Computer
Software: An Economic Analysis, 37 VAND. L. REV. 147. 148-49 (1984) (importance of computer
software in today's society is wide spread requiring adequate legal protection)..
2. See infra note 11 and accompanying text.
3. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (defining patent statutory subject matter as "any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter or any new and useful improvement
thereof, . . . subject to the conditions and requirements of this title").
4. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972).
5. See infra notes 179-200 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 179-180 and accompanying text.
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(C.C.P.A.) 7 and further refined by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (C.A.F.C.) 8 is also discussed and applied in the background section.
This comment submits that mathematical algorithms should be
patentable. It further submits that the statutory requirement of nonobviousness 9 would prevent pre-emption of an algorithm by a patent applicant if the algorithm is common knowledge in the particular art.'0 If,
however, the algorithm is new and useful, the statutory requirement of
nonobviousness would not prevent the applicant from obtaining patent
protection.
Allowing patents for processes and apparatuses containing mathematical algorithms would properly reward software programmers and
inventors for their skill and hard work in advancing science and technology. This offers an incentive to the inventor to create new and useful
processes and apparatuses that would benefit the public.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Patent Policy

The primary goal of patent law is scientific advancement and public dissemination of such advancement." The patent system achieves
this goal by giving the inventor exclusive rights to make, use or sell' 2
an invention for a specified period of time,' 3 while the public receives
full disclosure of the invention." The decision to grant an inventor a
patent requires a determination of whether the benefit to the public in
obtaining the invention outweighs the burden the public must bear in
granting exclusive rights to the inventor.'"

7. See DONALD S. CHISUM. PATENTS § 11.06[3][B] (1991). The C.C.P.A. had jurisdiction
to review decisions of the Board of Patent Appeals. Id. The decisions of the C.C.P.A. were directly
reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. Id. The C.C.P.A. was replaced by the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See infra note 92.
8. Title 28, section 1295 of the United States Code grants the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit subject matter jurisdiction over patent issues. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1988).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
10. See infra note 20 (defining prior art).
II. Sinclair & Carroll Co. v.,Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945). The patent
system's "inducement is directed to disclosure of advances in knowledge which will be beneficial to
society; it is not a certificate of merit, but an incentive to disclosure." Id. at 331.
12. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988).
13. See id. § 154 (current statute allows exclusive rights for seventeen year period).
14. Id. § 112 (requirement of full disclosure to the public).
15. See WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, I ROBINSON ON PATENTS § 33 (1890).
The creation of a monopoly embracing these extraordinary privileges, with their corresponding limitations of the common right, could not be justified unless the ultimate results
of its bestowed were, upon the whole, highly advantageous to the public. That this is true,
experience has fully demonstrated. The granting of a patent privilege at once accomplishes
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/7
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Congress has the constitutional power to "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.""6 Since 1790, Congress has used this power to grant exclusive patent rights to inventors. 17 Currently, an inventor's patent rights are protected for a seventeen year term. 8 Further, an invention must meet the
statutory requirements of patentability. To meet these requirements an
invention must be (1) proper statutory subject matter, 9 (2) novel 0 and
three important objects: it rewards the inventor for his skill and labor in conceiving and
perfecting his invention; it stimulates him, as well as others, to still further efforts in the
same or different fields; it secures to the public an immediate knowledge of the character
and scope of the invention, and an unrestricted right to use it after the patent has expired.
Each of these objects, with its consequences, is a public good, and tends directly to the
advancement of the industrial arts. Any system of law which attains these results, without
the undue restriction of natural rights, is evidently consonant with reason, justice, and
sound public policy.
Id. (footnote omitted).
16. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl.8. •
17. Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109, § 1, reprinted in ERNEST B. LIPSCOMB III, 9 WALKER
ON PATENTS, app.2 (1984). The eligible subject matter under the 1790 Patent Act included "any
useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before known
or used... "Id.
18. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). The seventeen year term provides:
[T]he right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the
United States and, if the invention is a process, of the right to exclude others from using or
selling throughout the United States, or importing into the United States, products made
by that process,[ ] referring to the specification for the particulars thereof.
Id.
19. Id. § 101. Statutory subject includes: "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof... " Id.
20. Id. § 102. The novelty requirement states that a person is entitled to a patent unless:
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a
printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of
the application for patent in the United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or was the subject of an
inventor's certificate, by the applicant or his legal representatives or assigns in a foreign
country prior to the date of the application for patent in this country on an application for
patent or inventor's certificate filed more than twelve months before the filing of the application in the United States, or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for patent by another
filed in the United States before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or on'an
international application by another who has fulfilled the requirements of paragraphs (I),
(2), and (4) of section 371(c) of this title before the invention thereof by the applicant for
patent, or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or
(g)before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining priority of invention there shall be considered not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to
Published
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(3) not obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the subject matter
of the invention.2 1 The statute also requires that the patent applicant
write a description of the invention in terms that would enable a person
22
skilled in the particular art to recreate and use the invention.
In order to obtain a patent, the applicant must show that the invention falls within proper statutory subject matter.2 3 Patent subject
matter includes processes, machines, manufactures or compositions of
matter.2 4 Using these four catigories, courts have excluded from patentability a number of subject matters including laws of nature, 6

practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive
and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the other.
Id.; see 130 CONG. REc. H1057 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) (defining "prior art" as "existing technical information against which patentability of an invention is
judged").
21.

35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). This statute requires that an invention must be non-obvious.

A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described
as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the difference between the subject matter sought
to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art
to which said subject matter pertains.
Id.
22. Id. § 112; see Donald S. Chisum, Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959,
962 (1986). Every patent contains one or more claims. Chisum, supra, at 962. These claims define
the invention, limit the scope of the patent protection, and determine whether an infringement on
the patent has occurred. Id. at 963.
23.

35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).

24. Id. Title 35, section 100(b) of the United States Code states "[t]he term 'process'
means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, or material." Id. § 100(b). See generally LIPscoMB, supra note 17, § 2.7
(defining and dividing machines into four classes: (1) embraces the entire machine and is better
defined as an apparatus; (2) embraces one or more parts of the apparatus but not the apparatus as
a whole; (3) embraces both a new element and combination of elements, some of which may be
previously known; and (4) all of the elements of the apparatus are known but the invention involves a new combination of the known elements to produce a new and useful invention); id. § 2.9
(defining composition of matter as a broad class which "embraces chemical. compounds, mechanical or physical mixtures, alloys and a great variety of things"); RoBIN ON, supra note 15, § 183
(defining a manufacture as "the parts of a machine considered separately from the machine itself,
all kinds of tools and fabrics, and every other vendible substance which is neither a complete
machine nor produced by a mere union of ingredients").
25. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (requiring
that the patent claim must be to a new and useful application of the law of nature); O'Reilley v.
Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112-13 (1853) (explaining that the claim was not patentable because it tried to patent electromagnetism, a law of nature, and was not directed toward any particular apparatus or process that used electromagnetism); LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156
(1852) (holding that no one could claim patent rights to abstract principles because they are
fundamental truths).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/7
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printed matter,2 6 methods for doing business, 7 ideas 28 and mathematical expressions of abstract principles.29 The inability to patent either
laws of nature or mathematical expression of abstract principles limit
the patentability of algorithms.
B.

Judicial Doctrine Limiting the Patentability of Algorithms

1. Mental Steps Doctrine
The mental steps doctrine was the first limitation directed toward
the patentability of processes using mathematical algorithms.3 0 This
doctrine developed from the C.C.P.A.'s distinction between the nonpatentability of laws of nature and the acceptance of patent claims that
apply laws of nature to create new and useful inventions."a The doctrine stated that "inventions which require human thought in whole or
in part for their practice were judicially considered not to be patentable
subject matter. 3 2

26. See United States Credit Sys. Co. v. American Credit Indem. Co., 59 F. 139 (2d Cir.
1893) (holding 'standardized business forms unpatentable); In re Russell, 48 F.2d 668, 669
(C.C.P.A. 1931). "[Alrrangement of printed matter on . . .paper does not constitute" any new
and useful art. Russell, 48 F.2d at 669.
27. See Guthrie v. Curlett, 10 F.2d 725, 726 (2d Cir. 1926). A tariff index consolidating all
active tariffs for a particular railroad is not patentable. Id. Systems for business transactions, for
example methods for maintaining restaurant records, are not proper statutory subject matter. Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908); Ex parte Murray, 9 U.S.P.Q.
2d. (BNA) 1819 (1988) (explaining that a program which sorts, debits, and totals expenditures in
order to issue an expense analysis statement was considered conducting business and, therefore,
not proper statutory subject matter). But see Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1369 (D. Del. 1983). The court held
computer software developed for the "financial management of individual brokerage accounts"
patentable. Id. A patent which improves business practices if done by hand is not proper statutory
subject matter. Id. The software, however, operates on a digital computer which places the patent
claim within the technological arts. Id.; In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765 (C.C.P.A. 1974), rev'd on
other grounds, 425 U.S. 219 (1976) (holding computer software for financial record keeping falls
within the technological arts and, therefore, patentable).
28. See Rubber Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.).498, 507 (1874). Ideas are
not patentable; the ideas must be used in a new device to be patentable. Id.
29. Compare MacKay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939) (finding a
mathematical expression or a scientific truth, by itself, is not patentable) with Eibel Process Co. v.
Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923).(holding inventor's patent was valid because
it did not attempt to patent the law of gravity but the use of gravity to improve on an existing
papermaking machine).
30. See Jeffrey A. Simenauer, Note, Patentability of Computer - Related Inventions: A
Criticism of the PTO's View on Algorithms, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 871, 885-86 (1986).
31. Chisum, supra note 22, at 967. See generally Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant
Co., 335 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (claim must be for new and useful application of the law of nature); O'Reilley v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112-13 (1865) (claim must be directed toward a
particular apparatus or process that uses the law of nature).
32. Donald E. Stout, Protection of Programming in the Aftermath of Diamond v. Diehr, 4
COMPUTER/L.J. 207, 209 (1983). See generally In re Shoa Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380-83
Published
by eCommons, 1991

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17:1

In In re Abrams,3 3 the C.C.P.A. developed an analysis for determining the patentability of a process which contained mental steps. 34
First, if a process claim consisted of only mental steps, it was pot patentable.3 5 Second, if a process claim included both physical and mental
steps, and if the only novel aspects were incorporated in the mental
steps, it was not patentable.3" Finally, if a claim included both physical
and mental steps, and the novel portion was incorporated in the physical steps, it was patentable."
The mental steps doctrine created a considerable obstacle for the
patentability of computer software. 8 Computers are able to perform
functions such as comparing, calculating, storing and sorting with
greater accuracy and in less time than human beings.3 9 All of these
functions, however, can be interpreted as mental steps, since the human
mind is able to perform all of these functions. ° Therefore, as a matter
of policy, the Patent and Trademark Office did not allow patents for
computer software. 4 '
The C.C.P.A., however, completely rejected the mental steps doctrine in In re Musgrave.42 The court determined that the mental steps
doctrine was unsound and had no statutory basis.4 3 According to the
C.C.P.A., all that was necessary to make a sequence of steps patentable was that the claim be both within the statutory definition of a process and be a technological art." Lower courts, therefore, cannot reject
a patent claim for computer software merely because all functions performed by the software can be performed in the human mind as well. "

(C.C.P.A. 1953) (mental operations considered unpatentable); In re Heritage, 150 F.2d 554, 55658 (C.C.P.A. 1945) (again establishing mental steps unpatentable); Halliburton Oil Well Co. v.
Walker, 146 F.2d 817, 821-23 (9th Cir. 1944), aff'd, 326 U.S. 969 (1946) (holding that the
invention comprised merely mental steps and, therefore, even if novel, was not patentable).
33.

188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951) (application for analysis of seismic data).

34.

Id. at 166.

35.

Id.

36.

Id.

37.

Id.

38.

See Simenauer, supra note 30, at 887.

39.

See Abrams, supra note 1, at 130.

40.

Id.

41.

See Chisum, supra note 22, at 969.

42.

431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).

43.

Id. at 889.

44. Id. at 893; see also Chisum supra note 22,.at 970 (arguing that the Musgrave decision
was the pinnacle of rationality in the area of algorithm patentability).
45. See infra notes 179-201 (discussion of mental
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/7
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United States Supreme Court Decisions Relating to The Patenta-

bility of Algorithms
a.

Gottschalk v. Benson: Limited Definition of an Algorithm

The Supreme Court's first decision interpreting mathematical algorithms was Gottschalk v. Benson." In this case, the patent applicant
claimed a program that converts binary-coded decimal numerals into
pure binary numerals. 7 The claim was not limited to any particular
apparatus as it was intended for any general digital computer. 8 The
issue before the Court was whether this programmed conversion could
be claimed as a process as defined by the patent statute."9 The Court
rejected the claim stating that it was not proper statutory subject matter under section 101 of the patent statute and, therefore, the program
was not a patentable process.6 0 The Court stated that a process is patentable if it is "tied to a particular machine or apparatus or [the process] must operate to change articles or materials to a different state or
thing."' 1 The Supreme Court did not, however, expressly preclude the
patentability of all computer software.5 1
Benson was significant because the Supreme Court defined "algorithm." The Court determined that an algorithm is "[a] procedure
for solving a given type of mathematical problem." 53 This definition
created confusion because the common definition of an algorithm-a

46.
47.

409 U.S. 63 (1972).
Id. at 64. Claim 8 of the application is representative and reads:
The method of converting signals from binary coded decimal form into binary which
comprises the steps of
(1)storing the binary coded decimal signals in a re-entrant shift register,
(2) shifting the signals to the right by at least three places, until there is a binary '1'
in the second position of the register,
(3) masking out said binary '' in said second position of said register,
(4) adding a binary '1'to the first position of said register,
(5) shifting the signals to the left by two positions,
(6) adding a one to the first position, and
(7) shifting the signals to the right by at least three positions in preparation for a
succeeding binary '1'in the second position of said register.
Id. app. at 73-74.
48. Id. at 64.
49. Id. Title 35, section 100(b) of the United States Code states: "The term 'process' means
process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material." 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1988).
50. Benson, 409 U.S. at 73.
51. Id. at 71. The Court stated, however, that this holding did not mean that all processes
which did not fit within this definition would not be patentable. Id.
52. Id.
53. byId.
at 65.
Published
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sequence of steps for solving a problem-encompasses both mathematical and nonmathematical material. 54 This confusion is well illustrated
by the Court's rationale in Benson. The claimed invention in Benson,
the conversion of binary-coded decimal numbers into pure binary numbers, is more ofa translation problem (nonmathematical) than a mathematical problem. 55 Applying the newly expounded definition of an algorithm to the Benson scenario, the Court could have easily accepted
the patent application presented there.5 6
b. Parker v.
Algorithms

Flook: Patent

Claims For

Processes

Containing

The Supreme Court next considered the patentability of algorithms in Parker v. Flook.57 In Flook, the applicant claimed a method

54. See Allen Newell, Response: The Models are Broken, The Models are Broken, 47 U.
PITT. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1986). "[A]n algorithm is an unambiguous specification of a conditional sequence of steps for solving a class of problems." Id.; Abrams, supra note 1, at 132. The
Court in Benson did not differentiate the mathematical algorithm, a formula, from the programming algorithm, a step by step sequence to solve a problem. Newell, supra, at 1024; Chisum,
supra note.22, at 976. "It is true that algorithms are often devised to solve problems of a mathematical nature. But algorithms may also be devised to solve all sorts of nonmathematical
problems." Chisum, supra note 22, at 976 (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Thomas G. Rickert, Algorithms as an Approach to Learning, 12 JURIMETRICS J. 170 (1971) (flow chart algorithm illustrating the reasoning process a lawyer uses in determining the enforceability of a promise).
55. See Chisum, supra note 22, at 977. The Benson algorithm involves mathematical steps,
however, the actual problem being solved is not mathematical. Id.
56. Id. For decisions by the C.C.P.A. interpreting the Supreme Court's definition of algorithm in Benson see In re Christensen. 478 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973). The applicant claimed a
method of gathering data on subsurface formation conditions then, by the use of a mathematical
formula devised by the applicant, determine the porosity of the formation. Id. at 1394. The court
held that the novelty of the claim was in the applicant's mathematical formula and that the data
gathering steps were well known in the particular art. Id. The court rejected the claim, thereby,
holding that it was nothing more than the solving of a mathematical equation. Id.; see also In re
Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 158 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (determining that patent claims must be analyzed
in their entirety); In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (financial record keeping system
that used a digital computer held patentable subject matter because it did not encompass a law of
nature, a mathematical formula, or an algorithm and therefore not considered an algorithm under
the Benson definition). The Chatfield court stated: •
Our reference in Christensen to a mathematical equation as being "at the point of novelty"
does not equate to holding that the claim may be dissected, the claim components searched
in prior art, and, if the only component found novel is outside the statutory classes of
invention, the claim may be rejected under 35 U.S.C § 101. That -procedure is neither
correct nor within the intent of Congress . ...
Chatfield, 545 F.2d at 158.
A comparison of In re Christensen to In re Chatfield demonstrates the C.C.P.A.'s attempt to
allow more processes containing algorithms to be proper statutory subject matter. The Supreme
Court quickly curtailed this pattern by its decision in Parker v. Flook. 437 U.S. 584 (1977); see
infra notes 57-71 and accompanying text.
57. 437 U.S. 584 (1977).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/7
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for updating alarm limits on process variables during catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons.5 8 The Court determined that the applicant's
method consisted of three steps. 59 The first step measured the current
value of the process variables."0 The second step incorporated an al6
gorithm that calculated and updated the alarm limit
6 2 value. ' The final
value.
updated
the
to
step adjusted the alarm limit
The Supreme Court stated that the applicant was not pre-empting
the use of the mathematical algorithm. 6a Instead, the claim specifically
limited the use of the formula to catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons. 4 The Court also stated that the claim had specific post-solution
activity which further demonstrated that the claim did not wholly preempt the use of the algorithm. 5 The Supreme Court, however, rejected
the application as improper statutory subject matter under section
101.68 The process involved in catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons was

58. Id. at 585. During the catalytic conversion process, operating conditions must be measured. Id. When any process variable exceeds a predetermined alarm limit an alarm indicates the
abnormal condition. Id. For example, when the temperature exceeds a predetermined temperature
range, the alarm sounds indicating the abnormal condition. Id. During steady operations, fixed
alarm limits are appropriate, but transient situations may require updating of the alarm limits. Id.
The applicant's claim is for a method which updates alarm limits. Id.
Claim I of the patent described the method as follows:
1.A method for updating the value at least one alarm limit on at least one process
variable involved in a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons
wherein said alarm limit has a current value of
Bo + K
wherein Bo is the current alarm base and K is the predetermined alarm offset which
comprises:
(I) Determining the present value of said process variable, said present value being defined
as PVL;
(2) Determining a new alarm base B1, using the following equation:
B1 = Bo(l.0 - F) + PVL(F)
where F is a predetermined number greater than zero and less than 1.0;
(3) Determining the updated alarm limit which is defined as B, + K; and thereafter
(4) Adjusting said alarm limit to said updated alarm limit value.
Id. at 596-97 (quoting app. 63A).
59. Id. at 585.
60. Id. An example of a measured current variable would be the process temperature. Id.
61. Id. The Court used the identical definition of algorithm incorporated in Gottschalk v.
Benson. Id.; see Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); see also supra text accompanying note
53 (Benson definition of algorithm).
62. Flook, 437 U.S. at 585.
63. Id. at 589-590; see Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71-72. A patent claim wholly pre-empts an
algorithm when the claim covers all potential uses for the algorithm. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72.
64. Flook. 437 U.S. at 590.
65. Id. The applicant claimed that the presence of a post solution activity, the adjustment
of the updated alarm-limit value based on the final result of the algorithm, made the claimed
process patentable. Id. See generally Chisum, supra note 22, at 993 n.125 (defining post-solution
activity as "activity after [the] use of the equation").
66. Flook, 437 U.S. at 594. The Supreme Court stated that mere post solution activity
Published
eCommons,
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well known and, therefore, within the prior art.6 7 Both monitoring the
process variables and adjusting alarm systems were also within the
prior art.68 The Supreme Court determined that the only new step in
the process claim was the method for calculating alarm limit values. 69
The method for calculating alarm limits was a mathematical algorithm
and, therefore, not proper statutory subject matter. 7 ° Thus, the Su71
preme Court held that the claim contained no patentable invention.
c.

Diamond v. Diehr: Approval of A Process Containing an Al-

gorithm - Court Looks to the Patent Claim in Its Entirety
In Diamond v. Diehr,72 the United States Supreme Court held
that the applicant's process claim for curing synthetic rubber was patentable.7 a The process included the use of a mathematical algorithm 74
and a programmed digital computer to improve the method for molding
75
rubber products.

ent draftsman, the Court reasoned, could attach a post solution activity to almost any mathematical formula thereby making it patentable. Id.
67. Id. at 594; see supra note 20 (defining prior art).
68. Flook, 437 U.S. at 594.
69. Id. at 594-95.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 596. The dissenting opinion argued that one unpatentable step in a process should
not render the entire process improper statutory subject matter. Id. at 599 (Stewart, J., dissenting). A patent process should be looked at in its entirety. Id. The dissenting opinion correctly
argued that a claim process should not lose its subject matter patentability because of one unpatentable isolated step. Id.
72. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
73. Id. at 192-93.
74. The mathematical algorithm used in the process was a common formula known as the
Arrhenius equation.
The equation can be expressed as follows:
In v = CZ + x
wherein In v is the natural logarithm of v, the total required cure time; C is the activation
constant, a unique figure for each batch of each compound being molded . . .; Z is the
temperature in the mold; and x is a constant dependent on the geometry of the particular
mold [being used in the process].
Id. at 177-78 n.2.
75. Id. at 180-81. Claim 2 is a representative claim and provides:
"I. A method for operating arubber-molding press for precision molded compounds
with the aid of a digital computer, comprising:
providing said computer for a data base for said press including at least,
natural logarithms conversion data (In),
the activation energy constant (C) unique to each batch of said compound being
molded, and
a constant (x) dependent upon the geometry of the particular mold of the press,
initiating an interval timer in said computer upon the closure of the press for monitoring the elapsed time of said closure,
constantly determining the temperature (Z) of the mold at a location closely adjacent
to the mold cavity in the press during molding,
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Prior to the'applicant's invention, the rubber molding industry had
not been able to make uniformly accurate cures76 because the molding
press temperature could not be precisely measured, thus creating difficulty in determining cure time.7 The patent application claimed a process which constantly measured the interior temperature of the mold.7
These temperatures were fed directly into a digital computer which
constantly recalculated the cure time by using a mathematical algorithm. When the calculated time equalled the actual cure time, the
computer signalled the press to open."0
The majority in Diehr found it inappropriate to dissect the claim
into old and new elements and subsequently ignore the old elements as
being prior art."' The Court stated that dissecting the claim in this
fashion was particularly inappropriate when looking at a process claim
because "a process may be patentable even though all the constituents
of the combination were well known and in common use before the
combination was made." 2 The novelty of any particular old or new

constantly providing the computer with the temperature (Z),
repetitively calculating in the computer, at frequent intervals during each cure, the
Arrhenius equation for reaction time during the cure, which is
ln'v = CZ + x
where v is the total required cure time,
repetitively comparing in the computer at said frequent intervals during the cure each
said calculation of the total required cure time calculated with the Arrhenius equation and
said elapsed time, and
opening the press automatically when said comparison indicates equivalence.
2. The method of claim I including measuring the activation energy constant for the
compound being molded in the press with a rheometer and automatically updating said
data base within the computer in the event of changes in the compound being molded in
said press as measured by said rheometer."
Id. at 179-80 n.5 (quoting the patent application claim). See generally Robert A. Kreiss, The
Theory of Overclaiming and Its Application to Diamond v. Diehr, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 97, 127-28
(1983). The problem with the Diehr claim was that it failed to comply with the particularity
requirement of title 35, section 112 of the United States Code. Id. The drafted claims were so
broad, the Court had difficulty determining what was actually trying to be protected. Id. at 14244.
76. See Diehr, 450 U.S at 177 n.l.
A "'cure" is obtained by mixing curing agents into the uncured polymer in advance of
molding, and then applying heat over a period of time. If the synthetic rubber is cured for
the right length of time at the right temperature, it becomes a usable product.
Id.
77. Id. at 178. Cure time may be defined as the amount of time required for the rubber
product to have desired physical properties. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 179.
81. Id. at 188.
82. Id. Title 35, section 100(b) of the United States Code states that a process "includes a
new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter or material." 35
U.S.C. § 100(b) (1988).
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element is irrelevant when determining the subject matter of a claim. 83
The Court held that an improved process for molding synthetic rubber
was proper statutory subject matter. 8 The application did not seek to
pre-empt the use of a mathematical algorithm; it only foreclosed others
from the use of the algorithm in conjunction with all other steps in the
85
applicant's process.
The Diehr dissent took the Flook approach and argued that a
mathematical algorithm for subject matter analysis should be treated
as prior art. 86 The claim can then be examined to determine if there
was any other new and useful concept in the process.87 The dissent concluded that nothing new was added to the physical process with the
exception of "a method of using a digital computer to determine the
amount of time that a rubber molding press should remain closed during the synthetic rubber curing process." 8 8 The computer estimated the
cure time "by repetitively recalculating that time pursuant to a wellknown mathematical formula in response to variations in temperature
within the mold." 9 The dissent, therefore, concluded that the application made no contribution to the art and should not be considered
proper statutory subject matter. 90
C. Patenting Algorithms Since Diamond v. Diehr
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the question of
mathematical algorithms since Diehr, the C.C.P.A. and the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (C.A.F.C.) 91 have had numerous occasions to examine claims involving mathematical algorithms. A discussion of the significant lower court cases exemplifies the confusion these

83. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188-89.
84. Id. at 187.
85. Id. The majority in Diehr correctly held that an industrial rubber process was proper
patent subject matter. See Chisum, supra note 22, at 997. The use of a computer to improve the
process did not make the process unpatentable. Id. The Supreme Court's decision in Diehr is
similar to the excellent opinion of the C.C.P.A. in In re Richman and helps clarify the confusion
caused by the Flook decision. David A. Blumenthal, Supreme Court Sets Guidelines For Patentability of Computer Related Inventions, 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 117, 122 (1981).
86. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 204 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 208.
89. Id. at 209.
90. Id. at 220. Justice Stevens stated:
[C]oncerns would be better addressed by (1) an unequivocal holding that no programrelated invention is a patentable process under § 101 unless it makes a contribution to the
art that is not dependent entirely on the utilization of a 'computer, and (2) an unequivocal
explanation that the term "algorithm" as used in this case, as in Benson and Flook, is
synonymous with the term "computer program."
Id.at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
91. In 1982, the C.C.P.A. became the C.A.F.C. The C.A.F.C. has subject jurisdiction over
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/7
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courts have confronted in determining whether a process or apparatus
containing a mathematical algorithm is patentable. First, however, a
standard to determine whether a process or apparatus containing an
algorithm was patentable had to be developed.
1. The Freeman-WalterTest: An Attempt to Develop a Standard for
the Patentability of Algorithms
In In re Freeman,9" the C.C.P.A. developed a test for determining
whether a claim which included an algorithm9 3 constituted proper statutory subject matter. The court used a two-step analysis. "First, it
must be determined whether a claim directly or indirectly recites an
'algorithm' . . . .,,9" Second, if a claim recites an algorithm,
then it
must be further analyzed to determine "whether [the claim] in its entirety wholly pre-empts that algorithm."9 5 If the algorithm is wholly
pre-empted, then the patent claim must be rejected as improper statutory subject matter.96
The C.C.P.A. tried to further clarify the second step of the Freeman test in its decision in In re Walter.97 The court stated that a claim
constitutes proper statutory subject matter if the algorithm defines
"structural relationships between the physical elements of the
claim (in.
apparatus98 claims) or . . . refine[si or limit[s] claim steps (in process 99 claims) . . . .-5o0 If an algorithm, however, is merely presented
92. 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978). The patent claim was a "system for typesetting alphanumeric information, using computer-based control system in conjunction with a phototypesetter
of conventional design." Id. at 1238. The claim was extremely useful in printing complex mathematical formulae. Id. at 1238-39.
93. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972) (defining algorithm as a procedure
for solving a mathematical problem).
94. Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1245.
95. Id. The C.C.P.A. held that the patent application did not directly or indirectly contain a
mathematical algorithm. Id. The court used the definition of algorithm given in Benson, "a procedure for solving a given type of mathematical formula." See supra note 53 and accompanying
text. The C.C.P.A. went further, stating that a broader definition of algorithm to include step by
step processes for problem solving would effectively eliminate all processes from proper statutory
subject matter. Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1245-46. This would be an absurd interpretation; therefore;
the decision in Benson can only be directed to claims that recite mathematical algorithms. Id.
96. Id.
* 97. 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
98. See LiPscoMB, supra note 17, § 2.7 (defining apparatus as a specific type of machine
which embraces the entire machine and not the parts that make up the entire machine).
99. See Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876).
A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act,
or a series of acts, performed upon subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a
different state or thing . . . . The process requires that certain things should be done with
certain substances, and in certain order; but the tools to be used in doing this may be of
secondary consequence.
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and solved by the claim and is not applied to "physical elements or
process steps, no amount of post solution activity 1 ' will render the
claim statutory."10
2.

Lower Court Decisions Since Diamond v. Diehr

The first significant lower court decision after Diamond v. Diehr
was In re Taner.'0 In the applicants' claimed process, seismic data was

100. Walter, 618 F.2d at 767.
101. See supra note 65 (defining post solution activity).
102. Walter, 617 F.2d at 767. The C.C.P.A. felt obligated to change the second step in the
Freeman analysis after the.Supreme Court decision in Parker v. Flook. Simenauer, supra note 30,
at 893. The clarification of the second step in the Freeman test was an attempt to harmonize the
test with the Flook decision. See generally Chisum, supra note 22, at 1003.
The C.C.P.A. continued to interpret the Supreme Court's definition of algorithm in conjunction with the Flook decision. It also began using the Freeman test to determine statutory subject
matter under title 35, section 101 of the United States Code. See, e.g., In re Maucorps, 609 F.2d
481, 485-86 (C.C.P.A. 1979). The Maucorps court used the Freeman test. Id. at 485. Using the
first step of the test, the court determined that the claim contained a mathematical algorithm. Id.
Using the second step of the test, the court found the applicant's process comprised a solution
technique for a set of equations. Id. at 486. The C.C.P.A. held that the applicant's claim would,
therefore, wholly pre-empt the algorithm in the claim. Id. The claim, therefore, was not proper
statutory subject matter. Id. In In re Bradley, the applicant's claim for an invention that relates
to altering and repositioning information in a computer system base for a more efficient operation
of a multisystem format was held to be proper statutory subject matter. 600 F.2d 807, 808
(C.C.P.A. 1979). The court looked at the first step of the Freeman test and determined that the
claim contained no mathematical algorithm. Id. at 811. The C.C.P.A. stated that the Patent and
Trademark Office was confusing what the computer does with how it is doing it. Id.
It is of course true that a modern digital computer manipulates data, usually in binary
form, by performing mathematical operations, such as addition, subtraction, multiplication,
division or bit shifting on data. But this is only how the computer does what it does. Of
importance is the significance of the data and their manipulation in the real world, i.e.,
what the computer is doing. It may represent the solution of the Pythagorean theorem...
in which case the computer is performing a mathematical algorithm and solving an equation . . . . On the other hand, it may be that the data and manipulations performed
thereon by the computer, when viewed on the human level, represent[s] . . .the text of a
court opinion retrieved by a computerized law service. Such information is utterly devoid of
mathematical significance.
Id. at 812. In In re Sakar, the applicant's claim contained a mathematical algorithm. 588 F.2d
1330, 1334 (C.C.P.A. 1978). The physical steps required in the claim were nothing more than old
and necessary data gathering steps required to solve the mathematical algorithm. Id. at 1335.
Thus, the claim failed to meet proper statutory -subject matter. Id. at 1336. But see In re Toma,
575 F.2d 872 (1978) (holding that a method which enabled a computer to translate from Russian
to English was patentable subject matter because no mathematical algorithm was claimed).
103. 681 F.2d 787 (C.C.P.A. 1982). This decision overruled In re Christensen, 478 F.2d
1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973). In re Christensen hel, that a claim which contained no more than the
known data gathering steps establishing values for variables to be placed in a mathematical algorithm was not patentable subject matter. Id. at 1394.
In re Taner overruled the holding in Christensen, but unfortunately did not give the exact
portion of the holding that was being overruled. 681 F.2d 787, 791 (C.C.P.A. 1982). But see In re
Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The portion of Christensen being overruled was the
point of novelty approach. Grams, 888 F.2d at 839. This approach required the new and useful
portion of the process to be a physical step. Id. The decision was not overruling that physical data
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/7
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collected in a well known manner and placed into a mathematical algorithm which converted the signal into a simulated planer or cylindrical seismic wave. 10" This mathematical conversion was beneficial because it reduced required data correction." 5 The court held that
although the claim recited an algorithm, the applicant was not trying
to patent the algorithm.' The claim stated that the process took conventional seismic signals and converted them into another form. 10 7 The
claim, therefore, fit into the definition of a process and was patentable
subject matter.0 8
In re Abele' 0 9 represented the C.C.P.A.'s first significant decision
using the Freeman-Walter test." 0 In Abele, the applicant claimed an
improved CAT scan imaging technique which reduced overall body exposure to radiation."' Using the first step of the Freeman-Walter test,
the court determined that the applicant's process claim contained a
mathematical algorithm."' Applying the second step of the test, the
C.C.P.A. held that the applicant had developed an application of a
mathematical algorithm to process steps which significantly improved
the overall CAT scan process."13 The claim used the mathematical
formula as a step within the context of the entire process which encompassed considerably more than the algorithm alone." 4 The C.C.P.A.

gathering steps that amount to nothing more than variables to be placed in a mathematical algorithm are not proper statutory subject matter. Id.
104. Taner, 681 F.2d at 778.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 790.
108. Id. at 791. The C.C.P.A., in holding this claim a process, relied heavily on the fact
that the claim transformed or reduced the article to a different state. Id. This definition of a
process is consistent with the Supreme Court's definition in Cochrane v. Deener. 94 U.S. 780, 788
(1877). The Supreme Court in Cochrane held that a process "is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing." Id.
109. 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
110. See also In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912 (C.C.P.A. 1982). In Pardo,the court again used
the Freeman-Walter test and held that a method for controlling internal operations of a computer
was proper statutory subject matter. Id. at 915. The court determined that the claim contained a
computer algorithm and not a mathematical algorithm as defined by the Supreme Court. Id.
Therefore, the applicant's claim was not within the mathematical algorithm exception to patent
subject matter. Id.
11. Abele, 684 F.2d at 904. CAT is defined as computerized axial tomography. Id. at 903.
This apparatus basically provides an image representing a transverse slice of the body. Id. The
computer mathematically interprets the data and then reconstructs the transverse slice on a television screen. Id.
112. Id. at 907.
113. Id. at 909. The C.C.P.A. compared the improved CAT scan process to the improved
process for curing rubber in Diamond v. Diehr. Id.
114. Id.
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therefore held that the process claim was proper statutory subject
11 5
matter.
. The C.C.P.A. decision in In re Meyer" 6 broadened the definition
of a mathematical algorithm. 1 " The applicant claimed a process
whereby a number of neurological diagnostic tests were performed and
the resulting data was input into a computer." 8 The computer stored
and accumulated test responses and, through the applicant's process,
narrowed the neurological malfunction possibilities.1 9 The court characterized the invention as a "memory aid for physicians."12 0 It also
stressed that the process merely narrowed neurological malfunction
possibilities and did not "conduct a diagnosis in and of itself."1 '
Applying the first step of the Freeman-Walter test, the Meyer
court held that the applicant used a mathematical algorithm. 22 The
C.C.P.A. stated that the computer used an algorithm to partially replace the thinking process (mental step) of the neurologist. 2 ' This replacement of thinking processes through the computer's use of an algorithm was, in the court's opinion, sufficient representation of a
mathematical algorithm. 12 4 The court then applied the second step of
the Freeman-Walter test. 25 Since the patent application involved a
process, the test required that the algorithm be applied to physical elements or steps.'12 Because the claim failed to apply the algorithm to
proper statutory subject
physical elements or steps, it did not 2constitute
7
patentable.
not
was
thus
and
matter

Id.
116. 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
117. Id. at 794-95. The court broadened the definition of mathematical algorithm to include
mental processes used in solving complex problems thereby excluding more from statutory subject
matter. Id.; see Chisum, supra note 22, at 1008-09. The court defined mathematical algorithm as
any mental process that can be represented by a mathematical algorithm. Meyer, 688 F.2d at
794-95.
118. Id. at 793.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 794.
123. Id. at 795.
124. Id. at 796. The Board of Appeals determined that the repetition of the data entry steps
at the very least would require "successive incrementation and/or decrementation [which would
involve] addition and/or subtraction." Id. at 794.
125. Id. at 796.
126. Id.
127. Id. The Patent and Trademark Office's determination that the process was directed to
a mathematical algorithm was based on the premise that all the physical steps in the process
leading up to the mathematical algorithm were nothing more than data gathering steps. Id. at
793. The C.C.P.A. agreed that these steps "cannot make an otherwise nonstatutory claim statutory." Id. at 794.
115.
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Seven years later, the C.A.F.C. decided In re Grams,1"8 a patent
claim substantially similar to that in In re Meyer. 2 9 Not surprisingly,
the result was the same. The court rejected the patent application."'
The applicant claimed a process that tested a system to determine
whether an abnormal condition was present."' The applicant further
claimed that the invention could be applied to any complex system including systems which were "electrical, mechanical, chemical, biological or combinations thereof."'13 2 The process first required data from a
number of clinical laboratory tests. 33 The remaining steps consisted of
a method for analyzing the data to determine whether an abnormality
34
existed.1
The Grams court looked to the decision of In re Meyer135 in order
to properly apply the Freeman-Walter test.'3 6 First, the court determined that the claim indirectly recited a mathematical algorithm." 7
Next, the court determined that the process was not applied to any
physical elements or steps.' 3 8 The C.A.F.C. found that the applicant's
process claim comprised no more than a gathering of data to be used as
variables in a mathematical equation. 1 39 The claim sought protection
for an algorithm and, therefore, the process Was not proper statutory
subject matter under section 101 of the patent statute.1 40
In In re Iwahashi,141 the C.A.F.C. held that the applicant's apparatus claim was proper patent subject matter. 4 2 The applicant claimed
an apparatus that calculated the auto correlation coefficient. 4 3 At the

128. 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
129. See infra notes 178-185 and accompanying text (similar because both cases are patent
claims for expert systems).
130. Grams, 888 F.2d at 841. The Federal Circuit stated that the exclusion of a mathematical algorithm was "at odds" with the liberal view of title 35, section 101 of the United States
Code applied in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). Grams, 888 F.2d at 837. Congress intended statutory subject matter to include "'anything under the sun that is made
by
man.'" Id. (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308-09).
131. Id. at 836.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
136. Grams, 888 F.2d at 840. The antecedent physical steps, unless novel and nonobvious
that merely determine values of variables used in a mathematical formula, are not sufficient to
make the entire process proper statutory subject matter. Id.
137. Id. at 837.
138. Id. at 839. The Court used a modified second step of the Freeman-Walter test. Id.
After determining that the claim directly or indirectly recites a mathematical algorithm, the second step requires "no more than that the algorithm be 'applied in any manner to physical elements or process steps.' " Id. (quoting In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 907 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 840.
888 F.2d 13701991
Published141.
by eCommons,
(Fed. Cir. 1989).
142. Id. at 1375.
143. Id. at 1371. Auto correlation en,-t
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time of the application, the state of the art apparatus used to calculate
auto correlation coefficients required expensive multipliers and complicated circuitry. " " The applicant's invention reduced the amount of
complex circuitry and determined the desired coefficient without the
use of an expensive multiplier.14 5 The applicant admitted that the claim

contained a mathematical algorithm, but argued that the claim was
limited to a specific apparatus and would not wholly pre-empt the algorithm. 4 6 The C.A.F.C. agreed and held that the claim fit within the
or manufacture and was thus proper patent
definition of a 4machine
7
subject matter.'
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's failure to concisely define a mathematical
algorithm has caused inconsistencies and contradictions in lower court
decisions.' 4 This lack of predictability requires, at the very least, a
change in the definition of an algorithm to clarify when patent applications will be denied as being based upon mathematical algorithms. Further, the courts should construe mathematical algorithms to be proper
patent statutory subject matter under the definition of a process and
exclude only those algorithms which are obvious to someone of ordinary
149
skill in that art.

A.

Judicial Exclusion of Mathematical Algorithms

The Supreme Court defines an algorithm as "[a] procedure for
solving a given type of mathematical problem.' 150 This definition is
problematic because it is inconsistent with the common definition of the
term "algorithm."'' An algorithm is commonly defined as "a step-by-

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1374-75.
147. Id. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection For Algorithms and Other Computer Program Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1024,
1102 n.294 (1990). The Federal Circuit's ruling in In re Iwahashi demonstrates that the form of
the claim of apparatus instead of process can make a difference in deciding patent subject matter.
Id. The court ruled in favor of the claim because it contained reference to a unit which contained
specific structured limitations which satisfied the Freeman-Walter test. Id.
148. See infra notes 178-200 and accompanying text.
149. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
150. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972).
151. See Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v..Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1366 (D. Del. 1983). The term algorithm has been misinterpreted due to
different uses of the term depending on the area of expertise. Id. The general definition of the
term algorithm may be misleading and unnecessarily detrimental to our patent system. In re
Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 156 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
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step procedure for solving a problem or accomplishing some end. " ' 152
The confusion resulting from the Supreme Court's definition, along
with inconsistent lower court interpretations, requires at least a more
precise definition1 53 or a complete elimination of the algorithm exception 54 to statutory subject matter.
The mathematical algorithm exception to patent subject matter
developed out of the established rule that an idea itself is not patentable. 55 Although a novel and useful application of a scientific truth or
mathematical expression is patentable, the truth or the expression in
the abstract cannot be patented. 5 6 The practical reason for nonpatentability of mathematical formulae is that an algorithm, in the abstract,
is a basic tool required for all scientific and technological work.1 57 By
permitting patent claims that pre-empt' 58 mathematical algorithms, the
law would allow a seventeen year monopoly on basic abstract ideas that.
are the foundational tools required for further scientific or technological development. 59 The United States Supreme Court in Gottschalk v.
Benson' used this basic premise to define a mathematical algorithm
and to exclude patent applications with statutory subject matter process and apparatus claims that pre-empt mathematical algorithms.'

152. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 70 (1988).
153. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 219 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (equating
algorithm with the term computer program). The Bens6n decision created problems because the
court tried to create a legal distinction between "mathematical and non-mathematical" and "algorithms and mental steps." Newell, supra note 54, at 1024. "The Cgurt did not acknowledge that
the term 'algorithm' is 'used in differing ways in mathematics (as a formula) and in programming
(a structural sequence to solve a problem).' This has had a long term effect on the protection of
computer software." Abrams, supra note 1, at 132 (footnote omitted). The determination of patentability of computer software "turns on the meaning of the term 'mathematical algorithm':
identifying this creature, and thus the initial limits of what is patentable software-related subject
matter, has posed substantial difficulties for the courts." CARY H. SHERMAN, HAMISH R.
SANDISON & MARC D. GUREN, COMPUTER SOFTWARE PROTECTION LAW, § 403.1(c)(1)
(1989).
154. See In re Grams 888 F.2d 835, 837 (Fed. Cir. 1990). An application of an algorithm
seems to indicate a type of process which should be contemplated as proper statutory subject
matter under title 35, section 101 of the United States Code. Id. The Benson decision, holding
mathematical algorithms unpatentable was poorly reasoned and irreconcilable with the case law
since the decision. Chisum, supra note 22, at 961.
155. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text; see also Chisum, supra note 22, at 967
(mental steps, one of the limitations on the scope of the patentability of algorithms, developed out
of difference between abstract ideas and application of abstract ideas).
156. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1938).
157. LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852).
158. See supra note 63 (defining pre-emption of an algorithm).
159. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). The Court
stated basically that one who discovers an unknown phenomenon of nature has no right to monopolize the discovery. Id.
160. 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
161. See Chisum, supra note 22, at 978-980 (describing Court's rationale in determining
that the mathematical algorithm is a law of nature).
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The mathematical algorithm exception to patent subject matter
has received considerable criticism.16 2 This criticism is warranted in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.16
In that decision, the Court held that man-made microorganisms were
statutory subject matter under the term "manufacture or composition
of matter."1 6 4 The Supreme Court looked to the words of section 101 of
the patent statute. 6 5 This section states: "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new or useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of
matter . . . may obtain a patent." '6 6 The Supreme Court stated that
the use of such comprehensive areas of coverage modified by the term
"any" meant that Congress intended patent law subject matter to be
given a wide scope." 7 The Supreme Court went on to say that Congress intended patent law subject matter "to include 'anything under
the sun that is made by man.' "168
By its very definition, a mathematical algorithm-which is a procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem-constitutes a
process.1 6 In Cochrane v. Deener, 70 the Supreme Court defined a process as "an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter
a
to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.1' 7 1 -When

162. See In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 837 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (algorithms are step-by-step
processes which seem to fit within the patent statute's subject matter); Richard L. Torczon, Copyright, Patent and The Virtual Machine, 9 COMPUTER/L.J. 321, 347 (1989) (a program or a reified algorithm meet the definition of a patent process).
The [patent] statutory scheme, includes within its subject matter the category of
"processes" in a broad sense. In the Flook decision, the Supreme Court admitted that a
mathematical algorithm came within the normal definition of a process. Given that literal
inclusion of algorithms within the patent system, the burden of proof on the excludibility of
algorithms in a judicial or administrative forum should shift to the side that seeks
exclusion.
Chisum, supra note 22, at 1011 (footnotes omitted).

163.

447 U.S. 303 (1980).

164. Id. at 308-09. The patent claim was for a Pseudomonas bacterium with 2 energy generating plasmids, each plasmid breaking down crude oil by a separate degradative pathway. Id. at
305. A plasmid is defined as a heredity unit separate from the chromosome of the cell.,Id. at.305
n.1. The bacteria were man-made and valuable in the treatment of oil spills. Id. at 305.
165. Id. at 308.
166. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (emphasis added).
167. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308. The Court also looked at the legislative history and
found support for a broad construction. Id. From the Patent Act of 1793, the Court determined
that the statute embodied Jefferson's philosophy that ingenuity should receive liberal encouragement. Id.
168. Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952), reprinted in 1952
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394).
169. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). The Court conceded that the applicant's
claim is a process in the ordinary sense of the word. Id. at 588.

170.

94 U.S. 780 (1876).

171. Id. at 788. Several recent Supreme Court decisions on the subject of algorithms still
used this definition. E.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182-83 (1980); Gottschalk v. Benson,
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/7
409 U.S. 63, 69-70 (1972).
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mathematical algorithm is applied to data, the data is transformed into
a differient state; this transformation fits within the definition of a process.' 72 The United States Supreme Court in Chakrabartystated that
Congress intended to include a wide range of subject matter within the
scope of patent protection by indicating that "any" process that is new
and useful should be considered proper statutory subject matter.17 3
It has been argued that mathematical algorithms are basic tools
necessary to perform scientific and technological work. 17 ' Therefore,
even though. a mathematical algorithm can be considered a process, it
should not be considered proper statutory subject matter because it
would monopolize the basic tools for scientific work. 75 This premise,
however, is inconsistent with the way the patent system operates. The
basic tools of research are those within the common knowledge of individuals in that particular art or science.176 Any basic tool that is within
the common knowledge of individuals in a particular art or science,
including a mathematical algorithm, would be obvious and not patentable under section 103 of the patent statute. 177 If, however, the basic
tool was new and useful, then it would be patentable.
B. Confusion in Defining a Mathematical Algorithm: The Incorrect
Interpretationin Expert Systems 7 8
Another significant problem with the algorithm exception to patent subject matter is the lack of a clear definition of "mathematical

172. See In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 837 (Fed. Cir. 1989). An algorithm, even without
physical steps, appears to be a type of process. Id.
173. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
174. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 (citing LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1852)).
175: See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591 (1978) (stating that an algorithm is a basic
tool needed for "scientific and technological work").
176. See Chisum, supra note 22, at 983.
177. Id. The author gives the example of a microscope being a basic tool in science. Id.
A
new and improved microscope would always be within the scope of patent law. Id. The author
also
considers the agreement that a mathematical algorithm is an abstract idea and therefore
is not
proper subject matter. Id. at 984. If a patent claim were too abstract it would be rejected
because
it would not meet the "disclosure and clear claiming requirements of the patent statute."
Id. at
984 (footnote omitted). See generally Kreiss, supra note 75 (discussing the problem of unclear
patent claims and overclaiming in applications).
178. See Samuelson, supra note 147, at 1115. An expert system is defined as "a computer
program or set of programs containing a body of knowledge . . . for the application . . . to
specific problems." Id. These systems allow the user to call on the knowledge of human experts
in a
particular field, for example medical diagnosis, in order to assist in solving a specific problem
in
that field. Id. at 1115-16. The computer program is set up using two experts, one with a computer
science background, the other with knowledge in the area of expertise. Id. The computer
scientist
uses procedures, strategies and rules developed by the area expert to develop a data base
which
represents the knowledge required to solve problems in his area of expertise. Id. The programs
are
used as aids for individuals responsible for problem solving in that area of expertise.
Id. See
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algorithm. ' 179 The courts' definition of a procedure for solving a given
type of mathematical problem is insufficient in that it fails to separate
180
an unpatentable mathematical algorithm from a patentable process.
Although both the C.A.F.C. and its predecessor, the C.C.P.A., have
attempted to use the Freeman-Walter test to categorize claims as either patentable processes or unpatentable mathematical algorithms,
their decisions cannot be consistently reconciled with previous opinions.
The lower courts' determination that expert systems"" are unpatentable mathematical algorithms demonstrates the confusion and inconsistencies with previous decisions. 8 2
In re Meyer"'a and In re Grams'" represent two expert system
claims rejected as being mathematical algorithms. 18 5 These decisions
extend the definition of mathematical algorithm to reject an application
18 7
1 86 In In re Chatfield,
that should have been patentable as a process.
the C.C.P.A. differentiated a mathematical algorithm from the broader
term "algorithm."' 8 8 The court determined that a "step-by-step procedure for solving a problem" is not the definition that the Supreme
Court desired.18 9 In re Pardo"'n took this rationale one step further and
stated that the Supreme Court's definition of algorithm must be construed as only dealing with mathematical algorithms, because, if the
extension included the common definition of the term "algorithm," it

generally Tod M. Turley, Comment, Expert Software Systems: The Legal Implications, 8 CoMPUTER/L.J. 455 (1988) (fully describing and discussing expert systems).
179. See Newell, supra note 54, at 1023 (stating that no matter what definition of algorithm the Supreme Court decided to use in Benson, it was doomed to fail because of the way
algorithms are conceptualized by the public).
180. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978). The Supreme Court stated that "[t]he
line between a patentable 'process' and an unpatentable 'principle' is not always clear. Both are
'concept*ions of the mind, seen only by their effects when being executed or performed.' " Id.
(quoting Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 728 (1880)).
181. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
182. See In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 915 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (stating that the Supreme Court's
definition only excludes mathematical algorithms); In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 889 (C.C.P.A.
1970) (rejecting patent claims because some or all steps could be performed by the human mind is
unsound and has no statutory basis). The definition of mathematical algorithm is quite different in
cases involving expert system or their previously decided cases. Samuelson, supra note 147, at
1119-20. A case involving an expert system broadened the definition of mathematical algorithm to
include mental processes. Chisum, supra note 22, at 1008.
183. 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
184. 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
185. See generally Samuelson, supra note 147, at 1113. The Patent Trademark Office has
issued patents for expert systems innovations. Id.
186. See Chisum, supra note 22, at 1009.
187. 545 F.2d 152 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
188. Id. at 156 n.5.
189. Id. To define a mathematical algorithm in its common usage would be "unnecessarily
detrimental to our patent system . . . ." Id.
190. 684 F.2d 912 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/7
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would exclude all processes from patentability. 9 ' A process by its very
definition represents a step-by-step process.' 92
In re Meyer and In re Grams are both examples of a step-by-step
process for solving a given problem. Because the In re Grams opinion is
based on In re Meyer, the remainder of this argument will focus on the
Meyer decision. The Meyer claim was for an expert system useful in
assisting in the diagnosis of neurological disorders. 9 3 The system took
the results of many neurological tests, analyzed the results, and then
narrowed the possible neurological ailments. 94 The claim basically acted as a "memory aid" for physicians.' 95 The court concluded that minimal mathematical calculation was involved in the process.' 96 The rejection was based on the fact that the applicant's process claim
represented "mental processes . . . for communicating possible solutions to complex problems."' 1 In coming to this conclusion, the
C.C.P.A. equated mathematical algorithms with mental processes, a
correlation clearly outside the definition of mathematical algorithms as
defined in Pardo.9 8 This definition is more in line with the mental steps

191. Id. at 915.
192. Id.
193. In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 793 (C.C.P.A. 1982). Claim I is representative of the
claim and states:
1. A process for identifying [sic] locations of probable malfunction in a complex system,
said process comprising the steps of:
(a) selecting a plurality of elements in the complex system, said elements having
known locations;
(b) initializing a factor associated with each of said elements;
(c) testing the complex system for a response, which response, if effective, requires
proper functioning of certain said elements, the probable identity [sic] of at least some of
these certain elements being known;
(d) determining whether said response of the complex system was at least partially
effective or ineffective;
(e) modifying the factor associated with at least some of said elements known to be
possible [sic] involved in the response in accordance with the effectiveness of the response;
and
(f) repeating steps (c), (d) and (e) for further responses of the complex system to
obtain resultant factors for at least some of said elements,
whereby said resultant factors are indicative of probable malfunction of their associated elements and thereby indicative of probable malfunction at the location of these
elements.
Id. at 792-93. It is clear that the method claimed does not contain a specific mathematical
content.
194. Id. at 790.
195. Id. at 793.
196. Id. at 794. The court determined that repeating several steps in the process required at
least addition and subtraction. Id.
197. Id. at 794-95.
198. Id. at 794; see In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 915 (C.C.P.A. 1982). The court stated " 'a
refusal to recognize that Benson was concerned only with mathematical algorithms leads to the
absurd view that the Court was reading the word "process" out of the statute.' " Id. (quoting In re
Published
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doctrine which the C.C.P.A. has subsequently abandoned. 99 The considerable inconsistencies in these cases demonstrate the difficulty in defining the term "mathematical algorithm."2 '
C. Nonobviousness: A Method for Excluding Certain Algorithms
If a process or apparatus containing an algorithm is determined to
be proper statutory subject matter, the application is further analyzed
under sections 102201 and 103202 to determine if the claim is novel and
nonobvious. The nonobvious requirement is an effective way to eliminate claims containing algorithms that would be obvious to someone of
ordinary skill in that art.20 3
The use of the nonobvious requirement to eliminate a claim containing an algorithm is exemplified in Ex Parte Bonne.2 0 4 The applicant
claimed an apparatus used to determine the combustion efficiency of a
burner.20 5 The apparatus contained sensors that determined the temperature and oxygen content of the burner's exhaust.20 6 The sensor
data was incorporated into a computer which applied a mathematical

199. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying. text (stating mental steps doctrine is unsound and has no statutory basis).
200. See also In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872 (C.C.P.A. 1978). The C.C.P.A. held that a method
fcr operating a digital computer to translate from one natural language to another specified natural language was patentable subject matter. Id. at 874. The fact that translation can be done in a
human mind does not make the claim invalid. Id. at 877-78. To determine statutory subject matter, one should not look to how the computer operates (addition, subtraction, multiplication, division), but what the computer is doing. In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807, 812 (C.C.P.A. 1979). If data
is manipulated in the computer and the final result is a page of a telephone directory, it would be
patentable subject matter because the final information does not have mathematical consequences.
Id.
201. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988); see supra note 20 (for entire text of section 102).
202. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988); see supra note 21 (for text of section 103).
203. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). The Court determined that the
legislature intended to codify judicial precedent. Id. at 15. In order to determine the obviousness
of the claim, the court must look to the scope and content of the prior art; the difference between
the prior art and the applicant's invention; and the level of ordinary skill in that art. Id. at 17. The
Federal Circuit court lists six factors used to determine ordinary skill in the art: educational level
of the inventor; particular problems encountered in the art; prior solutions to those problems; how
rapidly innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of workers in
the field. Orthopedic Equip. Co., v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d 1376, 1381-82
(Fed. Cir. 1983). Because of the Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Diehr allowing computer
software to be statutory subject matter, "[n]ovelty and nonobviousness will become the critical
parameters for [computer software] and statutory subject matter will recede into the background." R. 0. Nimtz, Diamond v. Diehr: A Turning Point, 8 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
267, 267 (1981).
204. PTO Serial No. 885,070 (PTO Board of Appeals Dec. 28, 1981) (unpublished opinion), reprinted in Simenauer, supra note 30, at 911.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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algorithm to determine the combustion efficiency. 20 7 At the time the
application was submitted, another apparatus which had sensors that
measured the identical parameters was already patented. 08 The sole
difference between the prior art and the new application was the computer computation of the mathematical algorithm.20 9 The Board of Appeals determined that one of ordinary skill in the art, aware of the
previously known algorithm 210 and faced with the same problem, would
have found it obvious to employ the applicant's apparatus claim. 1 ' The
Board of Appeals, therefore, rejected the application under section 103
2 12
of the patent statute.
Although few patent claims containing algorithms have been challenged under section 103, this requirement remains a viable means of
preventing pre-emption of an algorithm that is common knowledge in a
particular art. 2 3 At the same time, challenges under the nonobviousness requisite would allow a new and useful algorithm to be properly
patented under section 101 as a process.
An approach consistent with the underlying policies of patent law
would recognize mathematical algorithms as proper statutory subject
matter and exclude only those algorithms that would be obvious to
someone of ordinary skill in that art. This approach rewards an inventor's skill and labor by granting exclusive rights to the invention for a
specified term 2 4 and creates an incentive for inventors to use their skill
and labor to further scientific advancement. 1 5 These advancements, especially in the field of computer software, are inhibited by the exclusion
of mathematical algorithms from proper patent statutory subject matter. Since the invention containing a mathematical algorithm may not
receive patent protection, the incentives for inventors to produce such
scientific advancements are lessened.
Public benefit must be a consideration in granting an inventor exclusive rights to an invention.21 6 Prior to granting a patent, courts must

207. Id. at 912.
208. Id. at 913-14.
209. Id. at 914.
210. Id. The algorithm, regardless of its novelty, was within the prior art. Id. The outcome,
however, would be identical if the algorithm was actually of common knowledge in the prior art.
Id.
211.
212.

Id.
Id.

213. See In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 917 (C.C.P.A. 1982). The claimed invention containing
an algorithm would not be obvious to a person of ordinary skills in the art. Id. The application,
therefore, was held to be valid. Id.
214. Title 35, section 154 of the United States Code provides an inventor the exclusive
rights to use and sell an invention for a seventeen year term. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
215. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
216. Sincliir & Carroll v. Interchemical Corp., 328 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945).
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determine whether the benefit to the public in obtaining disclosure of
the invention outweighs the burden to the public in granting the inventor exclusive rights to the invention.2 17 If a mathematical algorithm is
obvious to a person of ordinary skill in that art, the benefit to.the public
in obtaining that invention would not outweigh the burden that the
public would bear in granting exclusive rights. The underlying policies
of the patent system are better achieved by excluding only algorithms
that are obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the art under section
103.
IV.

CONCLUSION

An algorithm, whether considered mathematical or nonmathematical, is a process. As a process, it should be patentable subject matter
under section 101 of the patent statute if it is new and useful. The
judicial exclusion of mathematical algorithms from statutory subject
matter is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of
patent subject matter. The fact that lower courts are unable to clearly
define a mathematical algorithm demonstrates the need to abandon judicial reliance on such terms for determining patentability. By permitting mathematical algorithms to be patent statutory subject matter and
excluding algorithms obvious to one with ordinary skill in that art, the
policies underlying the patent system are more adequately fulfilled.
Patent applicants, courts, and the public would benefit from the abandonment of the mathematical algorithm exclusion.
Patrick Edward Beck

217. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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